In recent weeks, this column has repeatedly insisted on the weakness of the State in the face of internal and external threats. Although Mexico has never had a modern, strong state, what has occurred over the past seven years has been devastating. On the one hand, the limited institutional framework built during 25 years of democracy was dismantled; on the other, public administration virtually disappeared, as is evident in health, education, and infrastructure. Even worse, the armed forces were distracted with business ventures while criminals were embraced; finally, public finances were mortgaged to secure victory in 2024.
Although they have celebrated a meager economic growth, half of it comes from Pemex’s creative accounting, which not only distorts macroeconomic figures but could also put the company at risk before the U.S. SEC. If all this were not enough, President Sheinbaum insists on an electoral reform that interests only her, causing entirely unnecessary damage to national unity.
I find what is happening deeply troubling because we lack instruments to prevent the collapse of the State or, if it occurs, to attempt to rebuild it. For 90 years, such an event was considered impossible in Mexico. We had a fictional democracy for decades, followed by a serious attempt that ended five years ago. The 2024 election was neither fair nor democratic, and the coup d’état that followed makes it unthinkable to return to that path in the short term.
Without the possibility of a peaceful, democratic transition of power, the options that appear are not attractive—especially in a global context that has changed dramatically in the past year. Donald Trump, acting beyond the legal powers of his office, has acted against three countries suffering internal occupation. In all three, the armed forces were aimed at subduing their own populations, not confronting external enemies. All three also promoted violence in other countries, seeking to export their authoritarian systems.
Maduro’s capture was presented as the extraterritorial application of the law, labeling him a cartel leader and arguing that he was not head of state since he had lost the most recent election. Pressure on Cuba revives old grievances and now takes the form of an actual blockade. The attack on Iran is framed as preventive against a country capable of attacking U.S. interests and, it is said, close to acquiring nuclear weapons. All are pretexts. Actions in the Americas respond to Trump’s conviction that he must control the Western Hemisphere, specifically to reduce China’s presence—already rolled back from the Panama Canal. The same logic applies to Iran, an important partner of China not only because of oil sold covertly, but also because of the chimera once called “Belt and Road.”
Trump’s objective is not to extend liberal democracy, but to weaken China by eliminating the partners it used to keep the United States occupied. The decapitations in Venezuela, Cuba, and now Iran are partial. Because they occur in countries that have endured internal occupation for nearly three, five, and seven decades, the population’s ability to seize the moment is limited—greater in Venezuela (three decades), less in Iran (five), almost nonexistent in Cuba (seven).
It has been a long time since we faced such a complex global environment—or such a weakened State. Attempting internal occupation in Mexico at this moment would be a grave mistake, yet that is where the actions of the past seven years seem to be leading. They do not see their neighbors’ beards burning; they believe they need not soak their own.