The Mexican Army (not the Navy), with intelligence support from the recently created Joint Interagency Task Force of the U.S. Army’s Northern Command, located and detained Nemesio Oseguera, “El Mencho,” who died during his transfer to Mexico City due to wounds sustained in the confrontation. The CJNG’s reaction affected more than 20 states, included the destruction of hundreds of stores and trucks, and cost dozens of lives. These are the facts. What follows are interpretations.
All indications are that President Sheinbaum was either unaware of—or did not grasp—the magnitude of the event on Sunday morning. By Monday, however, it seemed as though the world had come crashing down on her. Suddenly, the story of “hugs not bullets,” the sovereigntist litany, and any hope of having a peaceful country on the eve of the World Cup were over. Tuesday’s attempt to return to normal—that is, to hand out money—I doubt will have much future.
The CJNG had become the most significant threat to the Mexican state: the most solid attempt at replacement we have seen. It was not concentrated solely on drug trafficking, nor limited to a handful of states; it had diversified and expanded, controlling markets, municipalities, routes. This process occurred through alliances with local groups, without the vertical structure of the old cartels, so it is unclear what will happen after the fall of “El Mencho.” My impression (not very reliable) is that dispersion will prevail over simple leadership replacement. In any case, we should expect violence.
Various specialists insist that the only solution is the legalization of drugs. I believe that ship has already sailed. The problem of organized crime in Mexico has become something else, something I suggested nearly twenty years ago to those responsible for the issue: the replacement of the State. As Mancur Olson proposed decades ago, the State is a stationary bandit that offers protection against other bandits in exchange for a portion of people’s wealth. It is built on violence, of which it holds the legitimate monopoly. Its basic commitment is to guarantee “national security” (defend the population from external groups) and administer justice (resolve internal conflicts). In exchange, as you know, there are taxes.
When those taxes are used for other purposes, and the basic commitment ceases to be fulfilled, the State collapses and is replaced by local powers willing to offer security and justice, according to their own judgment, in exchange for their “fee.” For historical reasons I have outlined in Conspiraciones, a recent book, the Mexican State was constructed by grouping those local powers together, adding corporate groups, and inventing a collective illusion called “Revolutionary Nationalism.” There was never a strong State, much less one bound by legal limits or intent on responding to the population.
Faithful followers of that collective illusion did not believe in the threat of replacement. Peña Nieto by omission, and López by commission, facilitated the collapse of the State. It still retains enough strength to confront the most powerful cartel, but not all of them at once. It is incapable of limiting the damage generated by the fall of criminal leaders: it was not able to do so in 2009 with the Sinaloa–Beltrán and Gulf–Zetas fractures; it has not been able to do so with the Chapos–Mayo split; and what is coming will be even greater.
In other words, the challenge we face is not the growth of criminal groups, but the weakness of the State. A weakness that seems to be reaching a terminal phase, with President Sheinbaum seeking electoral reform, the Court in the hands of the ignorant, a population yearning for handouts, and the most dangerous global environment in a hundred years. It is worth being clear about the problem.